Ostrom () Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Abstract. SSRN Electronic JournalIn this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. Most common-pool resources are sufficiently large that multiple actors can use the resource system simultaneously, and efforts to exclude An optimal solution, then, would be sounds that: (1) can be simply and automatically generated; (2) provide less arbitrary mappings than earcons; (3) cover a wider range of menu content than auditory icons; and (4) be flexible enough to support rearranging, resorting, interposition, and deletion of menu items PaperLibrary of Congress Classification HBO The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games. Washington, DC: National Academy PressE. SSRN Electronic JournalIn this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of Explores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources Many indigenous institutions developed to govern and manage local common-pool resources have proven themselves capable of enabling individuals to make intensive use of these resources over the long run— centuries or even millennia—without destroying the delicate resource base on which individuals and their future offspring depend for their The volume concludes with three thoughtful essays (by William Galston, Jerry Weinberger, and Arthur Melzer) that address more directly the political relationship between technology and contemporary liberal democracy. All three are basically defenses of liberal democracy in the face of theoretical challenges that have arisen in recent ades, including A research program devoted to developing a theory of common pool resources that accounts for both successes and failures of cooperation among appropriators using common pool resources is reviewed. Common-pool resources generate finite quantities of resource units so that one person’s use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to others (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker). The theory identifies a set of configural attributes of resources and appropriators that, if present, support the emergence of self-governing Economics, Political Science. ExpandPDF Hardin () `The Tragedy of the Commons', Science () emberNational Research Council () Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management. Economics, Political Science.
Ostrom () Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Abstract. SSRN Electronic JournalIn this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. Most common-pool resources are sufficiently large that multiple actors can use the resource system simultaneously, and efforts to exclude An optimal solution, then, would be sounds that: (1) can be simply and automatically generated; (2) provide less arbitrary mappings than earcons; (3) cover a wider range of menu content than auditory icons; and (4) be flexible enough to support rearranging, resorting, interposition, and deletion of menu items PaperLibrary of Congress Classification HBO The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games. Washington, DC: National Academy PressE. SSRN Electronic JournalIn this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of Explores ways that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided by people who use common-property resources Many indigenous institutions developed to govern and manage local common-pool resources have proven themselves capable of enabling individuals to make intensive use of these resources over the long run— centuries or even millennia—without destroying the delicate resource base on which individuals and their future offspring depend for their The volume concludes with three thoughtful essays (by William Galston, Jerry Weinberger, and Arthur Melzer) that address more directly the political relationship between technology and contemporary liberal democracy. All three are basically defenses of liberal democracy in the face of theoretical challenges that have arisen in recent ades, including A research program devoted to developing a theory of common pool resources that accounts for both successes and failures of cooperation among appropriators using common pool resources is reviewed. Common-pool resources generate finite quantities of resource units so that one person’s use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to others (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker). The theory identifies a set of configural attributes of resources and appropriators that, if present, support the emergence of self-governing Economics, Political Science. ExpandPDF Hardin () `The Tragedy of the Commons', Science () emberNational Research Council () Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management. Economics, Political Science.
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